Optimal Portfolio Theory prescribes that investors reduce their exposure to financial market risk as they get near to retirement. To assess the effect of ageing on portfolio choices, we study the case of an Italian defined contribution pension fund during the period 2002-08. We find that on average the willingness to hold risky assets does indeed significantly decrease with age, but we also document that inertial behaviour is quite widespread, and can be very costly.
Introduction

1
In recent years, many countries have reformed their public pension system, tightening the eligibility rules and reducing the generosity of bene…ts (Feldstein and Siebert, 2002) . Partly as a result, private pension plans have grown in terms both of assets under management and number of participants (OECD, 2009) , becoming increasingly important as a means to provide adequate retirement income.
Contrary to social security schemes, private pension investment requires the worker to make several choices. He or she has to decide whether and how much to contribute, select the most appropriate portfolio and possibly decide when to withdraw. These choices are even more di¢ cult in a time of …nancial turmoil, when both the probability and the cost of errors are magni…ed. There is evidence (e.g. Benartzi and Thaler, 2002 ) that investors do not exploit the freedom of choice granted by their pension plans in the best possible way.
In order to design rules and policies which help workers to get the most out of their pension investments, it is important to understand if and how investors'behaviour is systematically a¤ected by individual characteristics, such as age and/or time to retirement, sex, …nancial education, income.
While there is an extensive body of research about pension plan participation decisions, far less attention has been devoted to portfolio allocation of fund participants. We aim to shed light on this issue looking at a new panel dataset collecting information on participants to a de…ned contribution (DC) pension fund for employees of an Italian middle-sized bank.
In particular, we are interested in assessing the e¤ect of ageing on portfolio choices.
According to recent optimal portfolio theories (see, e.g., Campbell and Viceira, 2002) , investors should reduce their exposure to stock market risk as they get near to retirement. However, it is often found that in reality investors are quite inertial in their behavior. 2 As far as we know, only two other papers have studied life cycle patterns in portfolio choices using panel data, both of which consider a sample of US workers. Agnew et al. (2003) use a four year panel of participants in a large 401(k) plan. They include age and time e¤ects in their regression speci…cation together with demographic variables. They …nd that "age has a negative e¤ect on the share held in equities: each extra year translates into lower allocation to stocks by 93 basis points". Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) use a panel data set from TIAA-CREF (a large US pension fund, open to public sector teachers and university professors) and …nd that a substantial number of households do not own equities and that individuals seldom take direct action to change their portfolio allocation. Over a 1 The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily re ‡ect the position of the Bank of Italy. We thank Sandro Momigliano, Giorgio Gobbi, and seminar participants at the Bank of Italy, the 10th Anniversary Conference of CERP (Turin, September 2009) , the Netspar Pension Workshop (Amsterdam, February 2010) and LUISS (Rome, April 2010) for useful comments.
2 Madrian and Shea (2001) , Papke (2004) , Agnew et al. (2003) , Americks and Zeldes (2004) , Mitchell et al. (2006) , Bilias et al. (2009). 5 ten-year period, 44 percent of the sample made no changes to their allocation.
We believe that looking at investors outside the US is interesting because elsewhere the pension fund industry is relatively less developed, and the equity culture is less widespread . Our sample is made up of a relatively homogeneous group of agents, characterized by a high degree of …nancial literacy, as they are mostly clerical and managerial workers in the banking sector. This clearly makes our sample not representative of the whole Italian population. However, it also implies that any deviation from optimizing/rational behaviour observed in our sample should be even more pronounced at the population level.
We use amministrative data from an Italian DC pension plan. While administrative records contain relatively few variables for each individual, data of this kind have the important advantage, with respect to survey-based data, of recording actual choices, thereby also reducing the risk of measurement errors.
The observed period goes from 2002 to 2008. Each year fund participants choose to allocate their accumulated wealth in one of …ve sub-funds, which are unambiguously ranked in terms of their risk pro…le. 3 Contrary to other papers, the set of alternatives is basically unchanged during the whole sample period. 4 Our empirical analysis shows that on average age induces investors to reduce their exposure to equities, as recent theories predict. However, we also document that many of them are quite inertial in their asset allocation and that this can prove to be costly, as older workers might …nd themselves over-exposed to stock market risk.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we describe the structure of the pension fund under examination. In the third section we outline the characteristics of our data set and present some summary statistics concerning investment choices and fund performance. In Section 4, we study the portfolio choices of the workers and the impact of age on the decision to switch from one sub-fund to another, controlling for several other possible determinants. In the last section, we draw some tentative conclusions and policy implications.
Fund structure
We draw our data from an Italian DC pension plan. Our dataset includes information on yearly individual investment choices for all 3,820 retirement accounts -outstanding for at least 1 year -from December 2002 to December 2008, for a total of 18,629 year-investor data points. The plan is sponsored by a medium sized Italian bank operating mainly in northern Italy and it is open to all the bank's employees. At the end of 2008, the plan covered about 97% of the workforce. Upon enrolment, participants choose one of the …ve sub-funds o¤ered by the plan. Once a year, at the end of November, participants can switch between sub-funds and change the level of their contributions. They receive a letter reminding them of the deadline; an advisory service (Internet and telephone-based) is active throughout the year, helping participants to self-assess their risk preferences and to choose the appropriate sub-fund. If they choose to switch, the change is e¤ective from 1 January of the following year. Participants can choose only one sub-fund among those o¤ered by the plan; that is, they cannot divide their accumulated wealth among several sub-funds. When a participant chooses to switch, her entire wealth is disinvested from the previous sub-fund and moved into the new one. Our dataset includes information on yearly individual choices and on demographic and employment characteristics, such as gender, age, marital status, position and seniority of service. As is often the case with administrative data, it contains no information on non-retirement wealth and on income. 5 This limitation is shared with the above-mentioned studies by Agnew et al. (2003) and Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) .
The plan o¤ers …ve sub-funds: guaranteed returns, money-market, bond, balanced bond and balanced equity. Each sub-fund has a target asset allocation, which the portfolio manager maintains during the year, rebalancing the portfolio when necessary. The moneymarket sub-fund is invested in euro-denominated money-market instruments (at least 80%) and other debt securities (up to 20%); the bond sub-fund is invested in euro-denominated money-market instruments (up to 20%) and other debt securities (at least 80%); the balanced sub-fund is invested in money-market instruments (up to 20%), other debt securities (up to 80%), and equities (up to 40%); the equity sub-fund is invested in money-market instruments (up to 20%), other debt securities (up to 50%), and equities (up to 60%). 6 The precise asset allocation of each sub-fund in a given year is communicated to participants every year before they choose their sub-fund. Each sub-fund's return and that of its benchmark are published on a regular basis.
Summary statistics
Participants'characteristics
In Table 1 we present some statistics on the demographic characteristics of plan participants (information on salary, marital status and job position, as of December 2008) and compare them with those of Italian private sector workers at large, taken from the latest wave (2006) of the Bank of Italy survey on household income and wealth (SHIW). 7 Our sample of di¤ers from the Italian population in several respects.
Workers in our sample have, on average, higher earnings than private sector workers in general and a higher level of education (94% have completed high school or college, compared with 44% of private sector employees). They are almost all clerical or managerial workers (98% of the total); mostly male (68%); relatively young (24% are less than 30 years old) and with relatively short job tenure (43% have less than …ve years of tenure).
About 40% of the participants has been in the sample for all the 7 years.
Investment choices
At the end of December 2008, 30% of fund participants had their wealth invested in the riskiest portfolio; 36% in the balanced one, 34% in the three remaining portfolios ( Table   2 ). 8 Through time, there has been a shift in the relative importance of the two riskiest portfolios, which are the only ones which invest in shares: in 2002 they were chosen by 75% of participants, in 2008 this proportion drops to 65%. This is probably related to the disappointing stock market performance during the observed period.
Switches only account for about 9% of all the investor-year observations: most participants con…rm their previous portfolio choices most of the time (table 3) . 9 However, during our 7-years period, 25% of the 3,820 individuals observed switched at least once.
The percentage rises to 48% among those that joined the plan from the start.
Male and female workers do not di¤er much in their portfolio choices, even though females switch slightly less than males (8,5% vs 9.9%). 10 With respect to education, the main di¤erence is between the least educated group (people with only a primary school certi…cate) and the others. Indeed, less than 60% of the former invest in shares, compared with more than 70% in the other groups. More educated switchers are more likely to switch toward more risky lines than less educated ones. There are no clear patterns with regard to job position.
Finally, sizable di¤erences are apparent across age groups. In particular, while the share of those who choose the two sub-funds exposed to stock market risk is above 75% for those younger than 50, it drops to about 50% for those over 50. Moreover, the propensity to switch is higher for older workers, and in particular the elderly are relatively much more likely to switch toward less risky lines. 7 The survey provides a representative sample of the Italian population. More information is available in Bank of Italy (2008) .
8 At the end of 2008 the total wealth accumulated in the fund amounted to e108 million. 9 This may be due, at least partly, to the fact that the intention to shift has to be noti…ed to the fund while the choice to remain in the same line is made tacitly.
1 0 On gender di¤erences in portfolio choices, see Barber and Odean (2001 (Figures 1-3 ). In particular, in 2008 the annual return of the balanced equity line was equal to -28% while that of the balanced bond sub-fund was -7%. Investing in one of these portfolios would have implied a severe loss in investors' retirement wealth, especially harmful for older workers, given their shorter investment horizon. In this section we try to evaluate the e¤ects of the decision to change sub-fund on realized returns.
First, we look at returns in the year following a switch. In the short term, changing sub-fund has been pro…table, allowing the investor to gain on average more than 1% with respect to a passive conduct.
As one-period gains or losses are more important for workers approaching retirement, which do not have the option to wait for market values to recover, we made separate computations for older investors. Workers 50+ y.o. who switched sub-fund at least once earned on average a return 2.9% higher than those who did not. Moreover, in 2008 older workers who switched sub-fund avoided considerable losses which amounted on average to 25% of their retirement wealth, i.e. more than e22,000. 11
While looking at one-period-ahead returns might be a sensible approximation for older workers, this is of course not true for younger ones, who have a longer investment horizon. So we also compute gains and losses for the whole sample period. We consider the individuals that were present from the start to the end of the sample and decided to change only once, then compare their 7-years returns at the end of 2008 to what they would have earned if they had not switched. On average, the cumulative gains from switching amount to more than 18%.
Multivariate analysis 4.1 A simple empirical framework
For illustrative purposes let us consider a very standard mean-variance investor with utility function:
where we assume that there is a risky asset (with mean return Er s and variance of the returns equal to 2 ) and a riskless asset (with returns equal to r b < Er s ) and that the worker can choose among 3 sub-funds (labeled 0,1 and 2), which di¤er in the fraction of the risky asset in their portfolios (without loss of generality, let be increasing:
We assume to vary systematically according to a set of individual-speci…c variables X it and an idiosyncratic preference shift " it :
This parameter measures the propensity to invest in the risky asset and it is thus linked to the degree of risk aversion: the higher the more the investor is willing to accept risk in exchange for higher expected returns. In our simple set-up, it turns out that:
Under the standard normality assumption for " it it is straightforward to derive the conditional distribution of it given X it :
where is the cumulative density function of the normal distribution. Note that in this simple speci…cation the thresholds do not vary across individuals.
This is an ordered probit model, where plays the role of the latent variable and it is the observable choice variable, and it can be estimated using standard maximum likelihood techniques.
Expected asset allocation
We estimate the model described in the previous section on the pooled set of workers'choices for the 2002-2008 period. Besides age (summarized by four age dummies), we consider as possibile determinants of the risk propensity parameter gender, marital status, education and job position. In all our regressions, we also include a full set of year dummies to capture unobserved time-speci…c e¤ects, among which (perceived) changes in the process driving share prices. These time dummies are also interacted with the four age dummies, to check for possible changes over time of the age e¤ect.
For the sake of clarity, we merge together the guaranteed return, the money-market and the bond sub-funds (however, we checked that results do not vary if we consider each of the …ve lines separately). Tables 4 and 5 give our baseline estimation results: in the former table we report the estimated coe¢ cients, in the latter we report the average marginal e¤ects of a change in the independent variables on the probability to choose each sub-fund. Table 6 shows how the probability of choosing each sub-fund changes through years and age classes.
Overall, the …ndings of the univariate analysis are con…rmed. In particular, the reduction in equity-holding due to ageing is statistically signi…cant. On average, the probability of being in a zero-share portfolio increases with age, while the reverse is true for the probability to be in the riskiest sub-fund. The e¤ect is particularly strong for the fourth age bracket (50+ y.o.).
In order to better assess the economic signi…cance of the e¤ects (Wooldridge, 2002) we compute the expected fraction of equities in the chosen portfolio, it ,:
The relationship between age and the holding of stocks changes across time, becoming stronger at the end of the sample; moreover, while in the …rst years of the sample the agestockholding pro…le is hump-shaped, starting from 2006, it becomes monotonically negative (Table 7 and Figure 4 ). This may be due to the fact that workers -observing the losses su¤ered by their colleagues who retired during periods of declining share prices -have learnt that being exposed to stock market risk when they are near to retirement is very risky. In 2002 a married male with a white collar position and a high school degree can be expected to hold in equities a fraction of his portfolio equal to 37% if he is younger than 30, which drops to 25% if he is older than 50. In 2008, these two …gures are 38% and 18%, respectively.
Concerning controls, being male and/or having a better job position decreases the probability of choosing a zero-share portfolio and increases the probability of choosing the riskiest portfolio in a statistically signi…cant way (Table 5) . No impact is instead attributable to education (in particular, a high school or a university diploma do not change the probability of holding equities). This could be due to the easy set up provided by the fund, and/or to strong social interaction e¤ects, such that the …nancial skills of the more educated workers bene…t also the less educated participants. We also considered a less parsimonious speci…ca-tion in which age was interacted with all other controls. However, such interactions turned out to be not statistically signi…cant. We can conclude that the relationship between age and portfolio does not di¤er for workers which are more educated or with a better job position. Finally, we also run a regression in which instead of the four age dummies we included age in years and age squared, but the results did not qualitatively change.
Conditional switching probabilities
In this section, we focus speci…cally on shifts from one sub-fund to another. As we saw above, most workers usually stay with the fund they have chosen, however 25% of them switch line at least once. Therefore it is worth examining the e¤ect of ageing on the propensity to switch.
To this aim, we exploit the panel dimension of our data set and run our baseline regression conditional on the sub-fund choosen in the previous year. This also allows us to control for unobservable time-invariant characteristics.
We proceed in two steps. First, we run our baseline regression on di¤erent sub-samples, grouping people according to the sub-fund that they chose in period t-1 (Table 8) . As before, dependent variables include dummies for gender, education, job position, marital status, years, and age.
Second, we use the estimated parameters to compute the conditional probability of switching from one sub-fund to another. The probabilities are summarized in conditional transition matrices (Tables 9, 10, 11 and 12). 12 The elements on the main diagonal of each matrix give, for a particular participant (e.g., a male, middle manager, higher educated, unmarried participant choosing his retirement account asset allocation in 2008), the probability of remaining in the old sub-fund; on the contrary, the elements o¤ the main diagonal
give the probability of switching from the sub-fund on the row to the one on the column.
We compute di¤erent matrices for alternative settings of the X variables in order to assess the impact of each co-variate.
The age e¤ect highlighed in the previous sections is again quite strong ( Table 9 ). The probability of remaining in the riskiest sub-fund is 96% for a less-than-30 y.o. worker, falling to 85% for a 50+ y.o. worker. Moreover, the probability of switching towards less risky lines starting from the balanced one is much lower for the young than for the old participant (6% versus 18%).
The likelihood of switching towards less risky portfolios is higher at the beginning and 1 2 A similar approach, applied to a di¤erent issue, is adopted by Nickell et al (2000) .
at the end of the sample, when the returns from the stock market were particularly disappointing. In 2005 (a year of relatively bullish markets), the probability of not changing fund was 95% for those starting in the riskiest fund and 93% for those starting in the balanced fund. These probabilities were, respectively, 93% and 90% in 2008, and 87% and 86% in 2002 (Table 10 ). Most importantly, the probability of switching towards riskier lines for those in the zero-equities portfolios was much lower during the end-of-period and the beginning-of-period stock market crashes: indeed, for those starting from the no-shares lines, the probability was 18% in 2005, compared with 4% and 2% respectively in 2002 and
2008. The e¤ect of job position on the probability of switching is not statistically signi…cant (Table 11 ).This is di¤erent from what we found in the previous section, in which we studied the probability of being in a particular sub-fund. Finally, education has a positive but small impact on the probability of switching from the zero-equities fund towards the riskier ones. (Table 12 ).
Conclusions
We studied investors' portfolio choices in a very simple real-world setup. Some results prove quite robust across all the empirical exercises we performed. In particular, we found a pronounced tendency to choose safer portfolios as people age. This e¤ect is still there after controlling for several demographic factors, for time e¤ects, and for the sub-fund chosen in the previous period. This result is broadly in line with other micro-evidence from the US market, and is consistent with models of life-cycle rational portfolio allocation.
Still, not all elderly people in our sample reduced their exposure to risk. Looking at the ones present in the sample from the start, it turns out that more than 30% of the elderly workers who were exposed to stock market risk in 2002 were still exposed to it in 2008. As the stock marlet events of the last decade show, an elderly worker taking risk on the stock market could pay a high price if stocks fall. This evidence suggests that life cycle funds could be a valuable instrument, given that they automatically bring all the participants toward less risky allocations as they get near to retirement (Viceira, 2007) . In the Chilean system, for example, a lifecycle fund is the default option for all the workers. Moreover, the riskiest sub-funds are closed to individuals older than a certain age.
The e¤ect of age is more pronounced in the last years of the sample. This might be due to the fact that investors learn form the experience of their colleagues. Indeed, in our sample there have been periods of disappointing stock market performance. Having seen that people who retired during these bear market periods have been severely hit might have pushed investors toward a more active behaviour. A better understanding of this form of learning appears to be an interesting issue for further research.
We also …nd that job position has an impact on portfolio choice (but not on the prob-13 ability of switching): people with a higher position tend to take more risks. This tallies with previous empirical analyses and can be consistent with optimal portfolio allocation (Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2008 , Chiappori and Paiella, 2008 and Cappelletti, 2009 . We also …nd that education has no clear impact on portfolio choices, even if it slightly increases the likelihood of switching for those in the zero-shares sub-funds. The weakness of this e¤ect could be due to the easy set up provided by the fund, and/or to strong social interaction e¤ects, in which the …nancial skills of the educated employees who make up most of our sample also bene…t the few uneducated participants. As an issue for further research, one could investigate whether this is due to social interactions taking place among colleagues in the same bank's subsidiary (Du ‡o and Saez, 2003).
14 All explanatory variables are dummies. Results for the interaction terms between age and year dummies are omitted. The reference dummies are: female, primary and middle school, blue collar workers, unmarried, 2002. Significance levels: 1% (***); 5% (**), 10% (*). Significance levels: 1% (***); 5% (**), 10% (*).
Gender Age
Changes in the population average probability of choosing a sub-fund when the value of a dummy variable changes from zero to one. 
Balanced bond fund
Note: Estimated probabililities implied by the ordered probit model. The reference is a male, white collar, high school and married worker.
Zero-share fund
Balanced equity fund 
The reference individual is a male worker, white collar, with a high school degree, married, choosing the investment fund at the end of 2008. The percentages show model-based probabilities to switch form the initial fund (rows) to the chosen fund (columns); the values within parentheses show the t-statistics of the difference between the probability in the same cell and the corresponding probability in the reference matrix (the top matrix). Probabilities in bold are statistically different from those of the reference matrix at the 5% significance level.
Initial fund
Chosen fund over 50 years old Note: The reference individual is a 30-to-40 years old male worker, white collar, with a high school degree and married. The percentages show model-based probabilities to switch form the initial fund (rows) to the chosen fund (columns); the values within parentheses show the t-statistics of the difference between the probability in the same cell and the corresponding probability in the reference matrix (the top matrix). Probabilities in bold are statistically different from those of the reference matrix at the 5% significance level. Note: The reference individual is a 30-to-40 years old male worker with a high school degree, married, choosing the fund at the end of 2008. The percentages show model-based probabilities to switch form the initial fund (rows) to the chosen fund (columns); the values within parentheses show the t-statistics of the difference between the probability in the same cell and the corresponding probability in the reference matrix (the top matrix). Probabilities in bold are statistically different from those of the reference matrix at the 5% significance level.
blue collar workers
Initial fund
Chosen fund The reference individual is a 30-to-40 years old male worker, white collar, married, choosing the investment fund at the end of 2008. The percentages show model-based probabilities to switch form the initial fund (rows) to the chosen fund (columns); the values within parentheses show the tstatistics of the difference between the probability in the same cell and the corresponding probability in the reference matrix (the top matrix). Probabilities in bold are statistically different from those of the reference matrix at the 5% significance level.
lower than high school
Initial fund
Chosen fund high school
